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Realism v Equilibrism about Philosophy* 
Daniel Stoljar, ANU 
 
Abstract:  According to the realist about philosophy, the goal of philosophy is to come to know the truth about 
philosophical questions; according to what Helen Beebee calls equilibrism, by contrast, the goal is rather to 
place one’s commitments in a coherent system.  In this paper, I present a critique of equilibrism in the form 
Beebee defends it, paying particular attention to her suggestion that various meta-philosophical remarks made by 
David Lewis may be recruited to defend equilibrism.  At the end of the paper, I point out that a realist about 
philosophy may also be a pluralist about philosophical culture, thus undermining one main motivation for 
equilibrism. 
 
1. Realism about Philosophy 
What is the goal of philosophy?  According to the realist, the goal is to come to know the 
truth about philosophical questions.  Do we have free will?  Are morality and rationality 
objective?  Is consciousness a fundamental feature of the world?  From a realist point of view, 
there are truths that answer these questions, and what we are trying to do in philosophy is to 
come to know these truths.   
Of course, nobody thinks it’s easy, or at least nobody should.  Looking over the 
history of philosophy, some people (I won’t mention any names) seem to succumb to a kind 
of triumphalism.  Perhaps a bit of logic or physics or psychology, or perhaps just a bit of clear 
thinking, is all you need to solve once and for all the problems philosophers are interested in.  
Whether those who apparently hold such views really do is a difficult question. But if so they 
are mistaken.  At least since philosophy began as a professional discipline at the end of the 
19th century, it has become increasingly clear that the subject is both extremely complicated 
and much more difficult than it appears at first.  Progress, when it happens, is a ‘one step 
forward two steps back’ variety, and concerns issues that seem smaller than one might have 
hoped initially.1 
The realist attitude to philosophy is not that different from a more familiar attitude to 
other fields of inquiry.  What is the goal of mathematics or archaeology or linguistics or 
history or physics?  A realist will say that here too the goal is to find out the truth about the 
questions that animate these fields.  At the limit, the realist is a realist about Wissenschaft, that 
is, systematic rational inquiry into any subject matter at all.  Systematic rational inquiry into a 
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given topic, according to the realist, has as its goal coming to know the truth on questions 
about that topic. Realism about philosophy is from this point of view realism about 




Is realism about philosophy true?  Not according to some philosophers.  For them, the goal of 
philosophy is not to come to know the truth of philosophical questions, it is rather, as Richard 
Cartwright2 once put it to “seek coherence—not only among philosophical opinions officially 
held but also between them and propositions which, outside the study, are irresistible objects 
of belief.” Helen Beebee3 has recently offered a detailed defence of this view, and has given it 
a good name, equilibrism.  This paper is a response to equilibrism in the form Beebee defends 
it.  
Equilibrism denies the realist view about philosophy, and so we may call it an anti-
realist view.  But equilibrism does not accept much of what goes along with that label.  It 
does not say that philosophical claims lack truth values or that they fail to be truth evaluable.  
Nor does it say that philosophical theses are false, or that positive versions of such theses are 
false.  It rather is a view about what the aim of philosophy is, and in fact a two-part view.  The 
positive part is that the aim of philosophy is coherence, i.e., to produce theories or 
propositions that have the property of cohering with some designated set4 of propositions; the 
negative part is that the aim is not truth, i.e. not to produce true propositions.  Clearly it is the 
second part which conflicts most directly with realism.  
One might think that any claim along these lines, whether realist or equilibrist, has an 
obviously false presupposition. Why think philosophy has a unique (‘the’) aim or goal; why 
not multiple aims?  For example, maybe it has one aim of producing theories that cohere and 
a quite different aim of producing theories that are true; indeed, maybe it has the first because 
it has the second.  
However, while philosophy may have multiple aims, properly understood the dispute 
here concerns what might be called its predominant or fundamental aim.  For the realist that 
                                                        
2 Richard Cartwright, Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).p. 10 
3 Helen Beebee, "Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
118, no. 1 (2018). 
4 What set of propositions?  In principle, different equilibrists may have different answers to this question, and 
nothing in what follows will turn on any particular answer.  What I will mainly have in mind however is 
Cartwright’s suggestion quoted in the text that the set includes other philosophical views and propositions that 
“outside the study, are irresistible objects of belief”.  
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aim is to get to the truth, for the equilibrist it is something else.  Admittedly, understood this 
way, the realism/equilibrism dispute does presuppose that philosophy has a predominant aim, 
and this might be denied.  Still, it can hardly be said that this presupposition is obviously 
false, so I will let it stand here.   
 
3.  Belief v Acceptance 
If equilibrism is true, what is it that philosophers are up to when they engage in the activity of 
philosophy?  What are they doing when they apparently put forward theories, object to the 
claims of others, make arguments, and so on?  
It cannot be that they are expressing beliefs.  For if they did they would be aiming at 
the truth, since to believe something is to aim at the truth, or so I will assume.  Rather, 
philosophical activity must be understood as being organized around a different mental 
state—not belief but something else.  Different philosophers have different views about what 
this mental state is.5 Beebee herself says that philosophers accept their views, rather than 
believe them, much as, according to Bas van Fraassen, scientists accept theories about 
unobservables rather than believe them.6  
What is it to accept a proposition, rather than believe it?  In general, mental states may 
be distinguished from one another on the basis of their different functional, normative or 
phenomenal roles.  Perception and imagination, for example, are similar in some ways but 
differ normatively:  perception justifies belief about the local contingent world around us, 
imagination does not.   
The same sort of thing is true in respect of belief and acceptance.  These are similar as 
regards elements of their functional role. Both believing and accepting some claim, for 
example, will other things being equal dispose you to defend the claim against criticism.  But 
belief and acceptance are normatively different, since they are correct under different 
conditions.   Believing that p is correct, or so I will assume here, only if the believed 
proposition, p, is true.  Accepting that p, by contrast, is correct if the accepted proposition, p, 
coheres with some designated system or set of propositions. To bring out the difference, 
consider a case in which some proposition coheres in the relevant way.  If, in that case, you 
accept the proposition, the issue of correctness is settled: you have done what you ought to 
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6 See Bas Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Bas Van Fraassen, 
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do.  By contrast, if you believe the proposition in that case, it remains open whether you have 
done what you ought to, since it remains open whether it is true.7 
The distinctive claim of the equilibrist is not simply that there is a distinction between 
belief and acceptance. That is unobjectionable, at least if the distinction is understood in the 
way indicated. Nor is the claim that philosophers sometimes accept their views rather than 
believe them.  That is unobjectionable too.  In philosophy as in other fields, people may 
sometimes be concerned with coherence rather than truth. The suggestion of equilibrism is 
rather that this is nevertheless the right attitude, and belief is not the right attitude, as regards 
philosophical propositions.   
As Beebee’s discussion brings out effectively, a position of this sort might be 
understood at a collective or at an individual level.  Suppose a particular philosopher in 
advancing some thesis aims at the truth.  It doesn’t follow that the collective of which the 
philosopher is a part—the community of philosophers distributed in time and space—is doing 
likewise, at any rate if we can make sense of communities having aims of this sort; nor does it 
follow that it is not doing likewise.  Similarly, suppose the community of philosophers is 
aiming at the truth.  It doesn’t follow that any given philosopher is doing so or that they are 
not.  In what follows, I will for the most part be considering equilibrism at the individual 
level, but what I will say should naturally apply to the collective level as well. 
 
4. Descriptive v Normative 
Taken as a thesis about individual philosophers, one might think there is a swift refutation of 
equilibrism, and in fact two swift refutations.   
To see the first, recall the opening sentence of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals: “It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which 
can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.”8   Don’t ask: is this true?  Ask 
instead: did Kant believe it?  Of course.  Nobody who has even a passing acquaintance with 
Kant can say he didn’t believe what he said.  The same point applies to many philosophical 
theses and many philosophers.  So an objection to equilibrism is that it has the false 
consequence that Kant and many others do not believe their views.   
                                                        
7 In distinguishing belief and acceptance in this way, I am assuming that the coherence theory of truth is false, 
where, on that theory, a proposition p is true if and only if it coheres with a designated set of propositions.  
Nevertheless, equilibrism is a cousin of the coherence theory.  Equilibrism says that a proposition p is (not true 
but) correctly accepted if it coheres with a designated set of propositions.   
8  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. H.J.Paton (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1785; repr., 1964). p.61 
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One might respond by appealing to the fallibility of introspection.  Maybe Kant 
believed he believed this but didn’t really?  That is unlikely.  It is true that introspection is 
fallible, and that even uber-rational people like Kant may believe things and not believe they 
do.9  But the suggestion that, when he consciously wrote the first sentence of the 
Groundwork, he was not expressing a belief at all is implausible just as an interpretation of 
what the man was doing. 
 The better move is to clarify that equilibrism is a normative rather than a descriptive 
thesis.  We saw earlier it is a theory, not simply about the aim of philosophy, but about its 
predominant aim.  We should now add that it is a claim, not about what that aim is but about 
what it ought to be; that is, about what the proper predominant aim of philosophy is.   So, in 
particular, what equilibrism entails is that the proper predominant aim is coherence rather than 
truth; hence, when it comes to philosophical propositions, the proper attitude—that is, the 
rationally appropriate attitude—is acceptance rather than belief.  This thesis entails that Kant 
was not rational in believing his view, but it does not entail the obvious falsehood that he did 
not believe his view.  
 
5. Is Equilibrism Incoherent? 
Maybe it avoids the problem about Kant, but isn’t there a second problem for equilibrism that 
is just as devastating? Philosophy is a subject in which self-reflection is central to the 
enterprise.  Meta-philosophy is a branch of philosophy just like ethics, logic, epistemology 
and so forth.  It follows that equilibrism is itself a philosophical thesis.  But now let’s ask: 
does the equilibrist believe it?  If they do, they contradict themselves.  If they don’t, why 
should we believe what they say? 
This objection sounds good at first but in fact peters out quite quickly. Yes, 
equilibrism is a philosophical thesis, and that means that the consistent equilibrist will accept 
it rather than believe it.  Likewise the consistent equilibrist will encourage us to accept, rather 
than believe, what they say.  But that by itself is no objection to them, it is simply accusing 
them of holding (or accepting) their view. 
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra has offered (personal communication) a separate but 
related objection.  Given the equilibrist’s own notion of acceptance, you can’t accept a 
                                                        
9 It might be, for example, that Kant had completely false beliefs about his own racist beliefs; for some 
discussion of Kant's racism, see Lucy Allais, "Kant’s Racism," Philosophical Papers 45, no. 1-2 (2016); Charles 
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philosophical claim unless that claim coheres with others.  What is it for one claim to cohere 
with another?  Presumably it is at least for these claims to be consistent.  But—and this is 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s point—to establish that two things are consistent is itself to hold a 
philosophical theory, at any rate a logical one.  For example, perhaps theory T is inconsistent 
with theory T* on one view of entailment but not on another.  If so, it looks impossible to 
accept a philosophical claim without believing some other philosophical claims. 
If Rodriguez-Pereyra is right, equilibrism would be self-defeating in a subtler way than 
the one we just considered.  Nevertheless, I think equilibrists may resist what he says.  For 
one thing, the aim of philosophy on their view is coherence, not believed coherence. It is 
correct to accept a philosophical thesis if it coheres with other things; it is not required in 
addition that you believe it coheres with other things.  Moreover, the equilibrist may again say 
that it is acceptance all the way; they may insist, that is, that claims about consistency of the 
sort Rodriguez-Pereyra points out are likewise proper objects of acceptance rather than belief.  
  
6. Entanglement  
Equilibrism may avoid the two objections just set out, but there is a further problem that I 
think is sufficient to reject it—and here the notion of ‘rejection’ may be understood either 
according to the realist or the equilibrist.   
The problem is that there is no way to separate philosophical claims from other claims 
from an epistemological point of view; philosophical propositions and other propositions, as 
we might put it, are entirely entangled. This makes it impossible, I think, to hold equilibrism 
about philosophy without holding it about everything else.  
Let me give some examples of the sort of entanglement I have in mind taken from my 
own area of expertise, philosophy of mind.  The first example is physicalism—the thesis, 
roughly, that everything in the world is either physical or grounded in the physical.  That 
thesis is usually intended to be contingent and empirical if true, an abstract claim about the 
world, epistemologically speaking like the theory of evolution or the theory of continental 
drift. Those who deny it, like the classical dualist and vitalist, hold views that might be true, 
even if, as a matter of fact, they are not. That is not to deny that physicalism is a philosophical 
doctrine.  On the contrary, large parts of philosophy of mind are devoted to whether various 
arguments for its truth or falsity are any good. 
If equilibrism is true, one should not believe physicalism, not because it is false, but 
because it is a piece of philosophy. But if one should not believe physicalism, by parity of 
reasoning, one should not believe theses that are epistemologically akin to it, such as the 
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theory of evolution or of continental drift.  But the suggestion that we should not believe these 
theories is extremely implausible, and in any case is not at all what the equilibrist wants to 
say.10 
For a slightly different illustration of the phenomenon of entanglement, consider the 
recently widely discussed doctrine of illusionism in philosophy of mind.11 The illusionist says 
that it is an illusion that you are in pain.  The point is not that you might feel the way that you 
do and yet not have a pain in your leg. If you lacked a leg but felt the way you do, there is a 
good sense in which you may be under the illusion that you have a pain in your leg. The point 
is rather that it is always a mistake to think or represent yourself in introspection as feeling as 
you do when you have a pain in your leg.  Perhaps you believe you feel this way in 
introspection, but, according to illusionists, beliefs like this are always false.  Critics of 
illusionism often respond12 with what has been called a Moorean argument—the name alludes 
to G.E.Moore’s famous argument about the external world—that goes as follows.  Premise 1:  
I am in pain.  Premise 2: If I am in pain, then illusionism is false.  Conclusion: illusionism is 
false. 
There are several interesting issues that arise in connection with this argument.   Here 
I want to notice that, while the claim that illusionism is false is presumably a philosophical 
thesis, and so the conclusion of the Moorean argument is philosophical, its premises are not, 
at least not in the relevant sense.  The second premise simply follows from the definition of 
illusionism, and the first premise is just the claim that you are in pain.   Hence, according to 
equilibrism, you should (or at any rate you may) believe the premises of the argument but you 
should not believe the conclusion. 
What does it matter that, according to equilibrism, you should not believe the 
conclusion of the Moorean argument?  In general, it is a requirement of rationality that if you 
believe some proposition p and you consciously and competently draw the conclusion that 
some other proposition q is true, then you should believe q.  But not in this case—if 
equilibrism is true.  The equilibrist is saying that, while you might believe the premises of the 
                                                        
10 At one point, Beebee (p.5) expresses puzzlement about Lewis’s attitude to Humean supervenience. Lewis says 
that he is interested in the tenability of this doctrine not its truth. But I think Lewis’s attitude here is similar to a 
common attitude to physicalism:  he means he is concerned with its philosophical tenability, not its empirical 
truth. See Beebee. 
11 See, e.g., Keith Frankish, Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness (London: Imprint Academic, 2017). 
12 See, e.g., see, e.g. Martine Nida-Rümelin, "The Illusion of Illusionism," Journal of Consciousness Studies 23, 
no. 11-12 (2016); David J. Chalmers, "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness," Journal of Consciousness Studies 
25, no. 9-10 (2018). 
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Moorean argument against illusionism, you should not believe the conclusion; rather you 
should only accept it.  But that is implausible. 
Could one reply by saying that the premises of the argument should be accepted rather 
than believed?  In the case of the first premise at least, that is an exceedingly difficult thing to 
say.  When you go to the doctor and tell her you are in pain, on the face of it you are 
expressing your knowledge (and so expressing your belief) that you are in pain, and you 
expect her to believe you and act on your belief. If she didn’t, you could initiate a malpractice 
suit.13  In the case of the second, definitional, premise, it is perhaps marginally easier to insist 
on acceptance rather than belief, but even here it is difficult.  If we can’t believe this 
definitional claim, how can we believe definitional claims anywhere, e.g., in the law or in 
mathematics?  And in any case, the Moorean argument could be reformulated as a one-
premise argument, as follows.  Premise 1: I am in pain.  Conclusion:  Illusionism is false if it 
is the thesis that pain is an illusion.  That argument is valid too, and while the conclusion is a 
piece of philosophy, the premise is not. 
The point of these examples is to bring out how much philosophy and non-philosophy 
are a package deal.  Some philosophical theses (like physicalism) are epistemologically 
equivalent to empirical scientific theses; some philosophical arguments (like the Moorean 
argument against illusionism) move from non-philosophical premises to philosophical 
conclusions.  To the extent that these examples are typical, as I think they are, it is impossible 
to hold equilibrism for philosophical theses and reject it for non-philosophical ones. 
Could the equilibrist respond by going whole hog and say that their thesis applies to 
all claims, not just philosophical ones?  I think this would be extremely implausible, but it is 
not necessary to establish this larger claim to show what’s wrong with generalizing 
equilibrism in this way.  For doing so robs equilibrism of its meta-philosophical point. The 
point of equilibrism is not that you shouldn’t aim at the truth in philosophy because you 
shouldn’t aim at it anywhere.  It is rather that there is something special about philosophy 
such that you should not aim at the truth here.  What the entanglement problem brings out, 
however, is that there is nothing special, from an epistemological point of view, about 
philosophy.  If so, equilibrism in the intended sense should be rejected. 
 
7. Cartwright v Lewis 
                                                        
13 Indeed, the proposition that you are in pain in such a case is, as Cartwright would say, an irresistible object of 
belief. 
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While the entanglement problem provides a good reason to reject equilibrism, I would not go 
so far as to say it constitutes a refutation—indeed, we are about to see that it is controversial 
whether any philosophical view is ever refuted.   But I do think the problem is powerful 
enough to put the equilibrist on the defensive: if equilibrism is going to be plausible, it will 
need some serious arguments to support it.  
What then are these arguments? Beebee offers two main arguments for equilibrism, or 
“challenges” for realism, as she prefers to describe them: one from methodology and another 
from disagreement.  I will turn to what she says about these in a moment, but first I want to 
consider a line of thought that, at least as I read her, exhibits more influence on her paper than 
either of these official arguments.  This arises from a well-known philosophical dispute 
between two very famous twentieth-century philosophers, Richard Cartwright and David 
Lewis.    
The story of Cartwright and Lewis is the story of two sets of collected papers.  In the 
introduction to the first volume of his Philosophical Papers, Lewis makes a number of 
remarks about the nature of philosophy.14 One thing he says—this explains the cautious 
attitude to the entanglement problem expressed at the beginning of this section—is that 
“philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively. (Or hardly ever.  Gödel and Gettier 
may have done it)”.  He goes on:   
 
Our philosophical theories are just opinions.  Some are commonsensical, some are 
sophisticated, some are particular, some general; some are more firmly held, some less.  
But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into 
equilibrium.  Our common task is to find out what equilibria there are that can 
withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of 
them…Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter 
of opinion. 
 
In the introduction to his own collection of papers, Cartwright responds to these remarks. He 
takes Lewis here to be expressing a commitment to equilibrism of the kind Beebee describes 
(though of course he was writing long before her and so does not use that term); indeed, it is 
in this context that he makes the remark I quoted at the outset.  What Cartwright then sets out 
to do in his introduction is criticize Lewis’s view so understood.   
What does this dispute have to do with Beebee’s contemporary defence of 
equilibrism?  Like Cartwright, Beebee takes Lewis to be committed to, or at least to be very 
sympathetic to, equilibrism.  Unlike Cartwright, however, she accepts equilibrism.  Hence she 
                                                        
14 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). p.ix 
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presents her view as supported by Lewis himself.  Of course, that a philosopher of the stature 
of Lewis endorsed, or came close to endorsing, equilibrism doesn’t entail that it is true, but it 
at least means that it should be taken extremely seriously. 
As against both Beebee and Cartwright, however, I don’t think Lewis is committed to 
equilibrism; nor do I think he is sympathetic to it.  Indeed, in a letter written to Cartwright 
about his (Cartwright’s) introduction, which Beebee mentions, Lewis says as much.15  “Dear 
Professor Cartwright”, he writes, “I have been reading the introduction to your F essays.  I 
think we may disagree less than you think. Let me try on a couple of irenic additions to what I 
said.” But the curious thing about Lewis’s letter is that, in making his irenic suggestions, he 
does not (to me at least) bring out the shape of the agreement and disagreement all that 
clearly.  What he does is point out things that at least implicitly are in Cartwright’s 
discussion. And that leaves us at a somewhat unsatisfactory juncture.  Do Cartwright and 
Lewis agree or not? Over what do they disagree? And what does this tell us about 
equilibrism?  
 
8. The Peircean Limit Argument  
I think we may move forward here by seeing underneath the dispute between Cartwright and 
Lewis a particular argument for equilibrism that I will call the Peircean Limit Argument.  The 
argument exploits the idea of an ideal epistemic limit—the Peircean limit, so-called in honour 
of C.S.Peirce who discussed this in connection with an epistemic notion of truth.  We are in 
the Peircean limit with respect to some proposition p, just in case we are in possession of all 
the evidence or rational grounds that we may have for and against p.   
The first premise of this argument is a modal claim, namely, that for any philosophical 
proposition p, the following is possible: (a) one is in the Peircean limit with respect to p; (b) it 
is appropriate in that situation to accept p; and yet (c) p is false.  So, for example, suppose that 
physicalism is the proposition in question.  What this premise suggests is this:  one can be in 
the Peircean limit with respect to physicalism, that is, one has considered all the evidence pro 
and con, all the arguments in its favour and all the arguments against; it is in that situation 
appropriate to accept physicalism, where ‘accept’ is to be understood in the way indicated 
above; and finally, what you accept is false, that is, it is not the case that physicalism is true. 
The second premise of this argument is that, if this is possible with respect to a 
proposition p, then it is also possible for two people to be in the Peircean limit with respect to 
                                                        
15See David Lewis, Letter to Richard Cartwight (1989).   
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p, and yet disagree over it.  Such people would be in a situation both Lewis and Cartwright 
describe as an ‘ultimate impasse’, that is, a disagreement between two agents both of whom 
are in the Peircean limit.   
The third premise of the argument is that, if you are one of a pair of agents in an 
ultimate impasse with respect to some proposition p, then it is not rational for you to believe 
p.  Suppose you are in the Peircean limit and you believe p.  And suppose now you confront 
another agent, also in the limit, who believes not-p. At least according to some philosophers, 
it would be wrong in that circumstance to believe p.16  Nevertheless, it remains appropriate 
for you to accept p; indeed, both you and your opponent in this situation are within your 
epistemic rights to accept p. 
The final premise of the argument is that, if it is not appropriate to believe some 
proposition in the ideal limit, it is not appropriate to believe it at all. What this premise does is 
generalize from the ideal to the non-ideal case, and via that, to every case.  The underlying 
idea is that, if one should not believe a proposition when epistemic conditions are ideal, one 
should not believe it when they are not ideal; and, since epistemic conditions are always either 
ideal or not, one should not believe it at all.   
These premises entail equilibrism.  The first says that, for any philosophical 
proposition, a certain possibility obtains; the second says that, if this possibility obtains, it is 
possible to be in an ultimate impasse with respect to this proposition;  the third says that, if 
one is in an ultimate impasse, it is not rational to believe the relevant proposition;  the final 
premise says that, if it is not rational to believe the proposition in the ideal limit, it is not 
rational to believe it at all.  It follows that for any philosophical proposition, one should not 
believe it but should merely accept it—and that just is what the equilibrist is saying.  
 
9. Cartwright’s Response 
These premises jointly support equilibrism, so what can be said for or against them? 
Cartwright in his introduction says a number of things relevant to the assessment of this 
argument, but his main idea, I think, is to reject the possibility whose existence the first 
premise asserts.  If you really were in the epistemically ideal limit with respect to some 
philosophical proposition, he wants to say, you would know that it’s true; hence it is 
impossible to be in the limit without its being true.  Related to this, Cartwright also denies the 
                                                        
16 I have in mind here philosophers that nowadays are called ‘conciliationists’ in the epistemology of 
disagreement.  See, for example, Adam Elga, "Reflection and Disagreement," Nous 41, no. 3 (2007). David 
Christensen, "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News," The Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 (2007). 
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possibility described in the second premise:  that it is possible to be in an ultimate impasse 
with respect to this proposition. 
What is Cartwright’s reason to reject the first premise?  The key consideration 
concerns a point we made earlier, namely that meta-philosophy is itself a sort of philosophy. 
Take a case in which “the disputants are apparently at an ultimate impasse” over some first-
order issue in philosophy.  For Cartwright, while such a thing might perhaps occur, that 
simply means “more work for the philosopher,” though of a meta-philosophical nature.  In 
turn this means that we are not in the Peircean limit we imagined ourselves to be, since we 
would not be in a situation in which all the arguments and evidence have been considered. He 
concludes:  “If a disagreement persists even though everything that could possibly influence 
the intellect is already in, and known to both sides, can it be a disagreement of opinion?  I 
think not”.17   
One might object that this way of dealing with the Peircean limit argument is not open 
to the realist, and so not to Cartwright qua realist.  In our terminology, what Cartwright is 
saying is that it is not possible that p is acceptable in the ideal limit and yet be false.  But 
doesn’t this by itself compromise realism? After all, Peirce himself is associated with an 
epistemic theory of truth according to which p is true if and only if p is acceptable in the ideal 
limit.  And that sort of theory is usually thought of as in opposition to realism.   
But this is a mistaken way to view the situation.  The theory that p is true if and only if 
p is acceptable in the ideal limit has by itself no bearing on realism.  What has a bearing on 
realism, if anything, is the stronger thesis that p is true if and only if, and because, p is 
acceptable in the ideal limit.  This is stronger because it entails, not merely that the truth of p 
is necessarily equivalent with its being acceptable in the ideal limit, but that the truth of p 
consists in its being acceptable in the ideal limit. But Cartwright doesn’t endorse this stronger 
claim; at least, nothing in what he says suggests that he endorses it or that he is required to do 
so.  
 
10. Lewis’s Response 
So Cartwright resists the Peircean limit argument by rejecting its first premise—what about 
Lewis?   
                                                        
17 Does Cartwright’s point about meta-philosophy run into the problem noted earlier? No; he is not saying that to 
accept a philosophical theory coheres you must know or believe some other philosophical claim.  He is rather 
saying that it is impossible to be in the Peircean limit with respect to a philosophical thesis without its being true. 
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Lewis accepts the first premise of the argument.  At any rate he accepts it with a few 
exceptions.   The remark about Gödel and Gettier quoted earlier suggests that there may be 
some philosophical claims which are such that there is a knock-down argument for their truth, 
an argument which would be available in the Peircean limit.  But such cases are (Lewis 
thinks) unusual, and the premise is true for the large majority of philosophical claims even if 
not for all. And that is almost as good as far as the Peircean limit argument goes.  
 Lewis also accepts the second and fourth premises.  At the beginning of his letter, he 
says that he and Cartwright “probably disagree on how often an apparently ultimate impasse 
really is one.”  He goes on to describe a dispute between himself and Graham Priest over the 
possible truth of contradictions as an ultimate impasse.  This strongly suggests that he thinks 
we are reasonably often in the ideal situation, and reasonably often disagree in such cases; if 
so, there is no motivation to think what is true in the ideal situation is interestingly different 
from that which obtains in our own.18   
Instead Lewis rejects the third premise.   Suppose you are in the ideal limit and accept 
some proposition p.  Should you believe p? Lewis says yes.  It doesn’t matter that no evidence 
or argument you have available to you that strictly entails p.  Nor does it matter that you 
might in principle confront someone who disagrees with you.  His position is that you should 
nevertheless stick to your guns and hold your belief. 
While Lewis thinks you should believe the relevant proposition in that situation, he 
doesn’t say outright that in such a case your belief will amount to knowledge.  Instead, in his 
letter to Cartwright, he points out that his well-known contextualism regarding sentences of 
the form ‘S knows that p’ means that, in certain cases, knowledge claims of this structure in 
the ideal limit will be false. That is because there may be contexts in which a relevant 
possibility has not been ruled out, in which case the knowledge-attributing sentence will not 
express a true proposition.  
Beebee says something about this issue that, if I understand it, seems to me mistaken.  
She interprets Lewis here as appealing to contextualism to defend realism about philosophy, 
writing, for example, of “Lewis’s contextualist solution to the problem of philosophical 
scepticism.”19 She goes on to argue that there is a weakness in any such contextualist solution, 
namely, that, while it might work in the case of individual subjects of knowledge, it would not 
                                                        
18 Indeed, this aspect of Lewis’s position seems to me quite typical of his philosophy, in which he often assumes 
that we are in an ideal or very close to an ideal situation.  This is the case in his discussion of physicalism, for 
example.   
19 Beebee. p.13.    
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work in the case of collective subjects, i.e., if the question under discussion is what we know, 
rather than what I know.   
But I don’t think Lewis’s remarks about contextualism are intended to be a response 
to philosophical scepticism or, to transpose what he says to our discussion, to help in the 
defence of realism against equilibrism.   For one thing, Lewis is a contextualist about 
sentences attributing knowledge not sentences attributing belief; nothing in his contextualism 
undermines the idea that it is rational to believe what one does in the ideal limit, even if one 
confronts an ultimate impasse.  Moreover, Lewis mentions contextualism not as part of his 
defence of his realism about philosophy, but as a possible objection to it.  As we have seen, he 
wants to say that, even if one is in the ideal limit there may be contexts in which one’s claim 
to know a certain proposition is false.  As I read him, Lewis accepts this, but does not think it 
undermines realism, in part at least because the same is true for many knowledge claims, ideal 
or not, philosophical or not.  
 
11. Where We Are 
Now that we have the Peircean limit argument before us, we are in a better position to 
understand the dispute between Lewis and Cartwright than we were before.  It is not that 
Lewis is an equilibrist and Cartwright is a realist.  In fact, Lewis and Cartwright agree that 
equilibrism is false and that realism is true.  They also agree that the Peircean limit argument 
for equilibrism is mistaken, as indeed they must given that they reject its conclusion.  Where 
they disagree is how precisely the argument is mistaken.  Cartwright rejects the first premise.  
Lewis rejects the third. 
 It is worth mentioning two further responses to the argument, distinct from those 
offered by Cartwright and Lewis.  The first rejects the fourth premise.  One might argue that, 
even if one should not believe some proposition in the ideal limit, it does not follow that you 
should not believe the proposition here and now, in the non-ideal case.  If you disagree with 
someone in the Peircean limit, that may be a reason to give up your belief, but it doesn’t 
follow that you should do the same thing when you disagree with someone not in the Peircean 
limit. Mere disagreement with someone is not a reason to give up your belief, but 
disagreement with someone in the Peircean limit might be. 
 The second alternative response is that the argument proves too much.  We have 
formulated the first premise in terms of philosophical theses, but an analogous premise will be 
true for many propositions, philosophical or not.  Take propositions about the future, e.g., that 
I will have dinner tonight.  If I were in the Peircean limit, that proposition may well be 
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acceptable.  Does it follow that it is true? No, I have very good evidence that it is true but the 
evidence doesn’t entail that it’s true.  But then, if the Peircean limit argument were successful, 
it would seem to establish equilibrism not just about philosophy but about everything—and 
again that is not part of the bargain.     
 Where does this leave us with respect to Beebee’s defence of equilibrism?  If both she 
and Cartwright interpret Lewis as endorsing equilibrism, they are mistaken.  Hence 
equilibrism cannot be motivated by the fact that Lewis endorsed it or even discussed it 
sympathetically; he didn’t.  And if she relies on the Peircean limit argument to establish 
equilibrism, Beebee is also mistaken—as indeed both Lewis and Cartwright would agree.  
What Lewis and Cartwright disagree about is not realism—that is why Lewis makes the irenic 
suggestions he does—it is rather about which premise in an argument for equilibrism is 
mistaken.  
  
12. Disagreement and Methodology 
I have suggested that equilibrism is implausible and the Peircean limit argument for it is 
unpersuasive.  But as I mentioned earlier, the considerations arising from the Lewis-
Cartwright debate are not the explicit reasons Beebee offers for equilibrism.  For her, the 
main considerations concern disagreement and methodology. I have criticized arguments of 
this type in some detail elsewhere, and won’t try to re-litigate these issues here.20 What I will 
do, however, is briefly point out that the discussion we have been having about the Peircean 
limit argument is enough to show that Beebee’s explicit arguments are unpersuasive. 
Turning first to the disagreement challenge, this starts, Beebee21 says, “from the 
obvious and undeniable fact of pervasive systematic peer disagreement.”  From this starting 
point the challenge is to explain how we can “claim to know or be justified in believing our 
philosophical views, when we know that equally capable and well-informed philosophers 
disagree with us.” 
This line of thought obviously raises themes that are present also in the Peircean limit 
argument.  The main difference is that, for Beebee, the disagreements at issue are ordinary 
non-ideal ones, whereas, in the Peircean limit argument, the disagreements obtain in the ideal 
case—they are ultimate impasses, as Lewis and Cartwright call them.  In the light of this, the 
first thing to say in response to Beebee’s disagreement argument is that, while it may be an 
obvious fact that there are disagreements of the kind she describes in philosophy, it is an 
                                                        
20 Stoljar. see chapter 7  
21 Beebee. p.11 
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equally obvious fact that there are such disagreements in many fields.  Should we therefore be 
equilibrists in these other fields as well?  As we noted before, this is not what the equilibrist 
wants to say.  The point is to be an equilibrist about philosophy, not about everything.  If so, 
and if this argument from disagreement is going to have any force, it must be that ordinary 
disagreements in philosophy are somehow different from ordinary disagreements in other 
fields.    
But it is not at all clear what this difference might consist in.  One suggestion might be 
that philosophical disagreements would persist even in the ideal limit.  If so, Beebee’s 
argument becomes very similar to the Peircean limit argument, and would be subject to the 
same sorts of criticisms.  Another suggestion is that, while there are disagreements in 
contemporary philosophy, these are perennial in a way that disagreements in other fields are 
not.  As I have argued elsewhere, however, it is quite unclear this is so; it is true perhaps that 
there are perennial disagreements over the topics of philosophy, but the questions themselves 
change over time.22 Moreover, Beebee offers no historical evidence of the kind that would be 
required if one really wanted to establish that disagreements in philosophy are perennial.   
Turning now to the methodology argument, the main problem with any attempt to 
argue from a premise about methodology in philosophy to a conclusion about equilibrism is 
that philosophy lacks a distinctive methodology in the first place—as indeed, Beebee herself 
mentions.  To say that it lacks a distinctive methodology is not to say that it lacks a 
methodology at all; on the contrary, at least from the realist point of view, philosophy is 
simply the application of the techniques of rational inquiry to philosophical topics.  But once 
again then, if the argument from methodology is to have any force, we need to be told what 
the difference is between philosophical topics and other topics such that the techniques of 
rational inquiry are up to answering questions about the second but not about the first.  
As before, however, it is unclear what this difference consists in.  Beebee herself notes 
in several places that there are open issues about rational inquiry, for example, the way in 
which it relies on theoretical virtues and intuition are currently matters of controversy.  But 
these issues are quite general and would cause a problem for the application of rational 
inquiry to any field, not just philosophy.  A more plausible way to develop the methodology 
argument is to emphasize again the nature of disagreement in philosophy.  Perhaps, as Beebee 
puts it at one point, “we have no grounds for trusting our intuitions…when they conflict with 
those of our philosophical peers.”    If this is how the argument is to be developed, however, it 
                                                        
22 See Stoljar. 
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is not distinct from the disagreement arguments we have looked at already and may be dealt 
with in the same way.  
 
13. Pluralism about Philosophical Culture 
My conclusion is that, in the dispute between realism and equilibrism about philosophy, 
realism is the better option.  Not only does equilibrism face problems that realism does not, 
there is no persuasive argument for equilibrism.  But what explains the appeal of equilibrism? 
I will end by briefly considering one line of thought I suspect is lying behind it. 
 The idea is roughly that realism is an intolerant view.  Suppose I’m right (by my 
lights) and you’re wrong—shouldn’t I then seek to silence you? Why not if realism is true?  
After all, if my goal is to arrive at the truth, wouldn’t that goal be thwarted if there are people 
around who disagree with me?  And what about if our common goal is to arrive at the truth; 
surely in that case we should aim to stamp out falsehood!  In sum, the realist about 
philosophy must reject a pluralist attitude about philosophical culture.   
 Equilibrism by contrast looks a tolerant view.  Since, on that view, we are not aiming 
at the truth in the first place, there is no reason for me to seek to silence you or for each of us 
to attempt to silence each other.  That leaves us free to be pluralists about philosophical 
culture.  In this sense, equilibrism is rather like its cousin, the coherence theory of truth, 
according to which there might be different equivalent sets of coherent propositions, each of 
which are true in their own way.   
 One response for the realist is to try to live with this consequence. Perhaps intolerance 
is simply an inevitable by-product of a steely-eyed focus on the truth?  But to think this is to 
ignore that there are powerful epistemic and moral reasons for encouraging toleration in 
philosophical culture.   As regards the epistemic reasons, the classic line of argument here has 
been offered by John Stuart Mill;23  Mill doesn’t have philosophy in mind in particular but we 
can adapt what he says to this case.24  The Millian argument (to put it very roughly) is that if 
your aim is to get to the truth, and if you are part of a collective whose joint aim is to get to 
the truth, the best way of achieving that aim is to encourage opposing views, perhaps as a test 
for your own view, perhaps to discourage dogma, or perhaps as an example of how a view 
can go wrong.25  
                                                        
23 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1859). 
24 For a recent general discussion of toleration in the context of religion, see  Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate 
Religion? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).   
25 Lewis himself thought this Millian defence of toleration was inadequate and offered a different epistemic 
argument for it, and for pluralism about philosophical culture, which turns on the idea that pluralism is the only 
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 As regards moral reasons, at least one motivation for encouraging pluralism may be 
extracted from recent discussion about the demographic facts about philosophy, namely, that 
the discipline is at the moment extremely non-diverse, with far fewer women and minorities 
than comparable disciplines. How did this sociological situation come about?  One plausible 
answer, defended by Kristie Dotson,26 is that philosophy at present exhibits what she calls a 
‘culture of justification’ rather than a ‘culture of praxis.’  As I understand Dotson, a culture of 
justification is among other things an intolerant culture.  It is a culture that implicitly or 
explicitly continually asks the question that is the title of her paper, namely, ‘How is this 
paper philosophy?’ where one effect of asking this question in this manner is to impose a 
single set of standards on members of the culture.  A culture of praxis by contrast is pluralist, 
not only about particular theses within philosophy but about what philosophy might be in the 
first place. If Dotson is right that the exclusionary features of philosophy are owing to its 
culture of justification, we seem to have a powerful moral reason to adopt a culture of praxis: 
in order to encourage a more inclusive version of contemporary philosophy, we should 
encourage a more pluralist version of philosophical culture.   
 There is much to say about the detail of these arguments, of course, but for my part I 
accept their underlying impulse: from both a moral and an epistemic point of view, we should 
be pluralists about philosophical culture. The important point for our purposes, however, is 
that it is a mistake to see any problem here for the realist.  The situation as regards philosophy 
is akin to the situation as regards religion.  Consider the realist about religion who thinks that 
religious claims are true or false, depending on what the facts are, and that people properly 
believe their religious views, rather than merely accept them.   Such a realist may nevertheless 
agree that as a matter of fact there is no prospect of overcoming disagreements about religion.  
If so, there is no problem with them believing, perhaps on Mills’ ground or on a variation of 
Dotson’s, that one should be a pluralist about religious culture.   
 What is true in the case of religion is true in the case of philosophy.  The issue about 
realism is an issue about the nature of the activity of philosophy:  is it an activity that aims at 
the truth or not?  The issue about pluralism is an issue about what sort of epistemic 
community we should construct:  should we aim for a pluralist community, and if so of what 
                                                        
way to avoid the risk of being dominated by falsehood; see David Lewis, "Academic Appointments: Why Ignore 
the Advantage of Being Right?," in Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy, ed. David Lewis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Lewis, "Mill and Milquetoast," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
67, no. 2 (1989). 
26 Kristie Dotson, "How Is This Paper Philosophy?," Comparative Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2013). 
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